I Cogitate

Viceroy Paul Bremer, his top pr flack Dan Senor, Doug Feith and former (present?) Rudy Guilani gorilla Bernard Kerik take it on the chin the most. Especially Bremer.

On page 32. it's noted that Doug Feith never gave Jay Garner, the first Coalition Provional Authority (CPA) leader, any formalized plans for reconstruction, for rebuilding the country because the underlying assumption was that the Iraqi civil servants would return and Pentagon/neo-con fave Ahmed Chalabi would simply be in charge and rule Iraq.

On page 33, Donald Rumsfeld wanted to pick Jay Garner's chiefs at ORHA (the Office of Reconstruction & Humanitarian Assistance)---rather than Garner. Rumsfeld also blocked State Department members from joining ORHA because they weren't trustworthy enough.

On page 34,  the first sentence of Garner's own post-hostilities-in-Iraq plan was: "History will judge the war against Iraq not by the brilliance of its military execution, but by the effectiveness of the post-hostilities activities."

On page 35, Michael Mobbs, Doug Feith's former law partner and a Richard Perle acolyte, was hired to be the Iraq civil administrator--Garner sent him back to Washington D.C. a week after arriving in Baghdad because of Mobbs' incompetency.

The State Department's Future of Iraq Project totaled 2,500 pages--not that anyone bothered to read it, let alone implement any suggestions.

Dick Cheney blocked Warrick Thomas, who was heavily involved in the Future of Iraq Project, from assisting in Iraq because Thomas despised Ahmed Chalabi. Donald Rumsfled made the call to Jay Garner telling Garner that Thomas was not acceptable. Thomas worked in the State Department.

On page 41, ORHA planned security for Iraq central bank, the National Museum and other sites, with the Oil Ministry ranked last. But the military didn't inform the ground commanders so this plan was never implemented.

Looting caused more damage to Iraq's infrastructure than the U.S. bombing did.

On page 52, Jay Garner is quoted: "I never knew what their (Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Feith) plans were but I did know that what I believed and what their plans were, were probably two different things."

The internal Iraqi power players  didn't want the exiles to be in charge and certainly not Ahmed Chalabi.

A Paul Bremer quote: "As long as we are here, we are the occupying power...it's an ugly word, but it's true."

De-Baathification was Bremer's choice, with no questions allowed. When informed of this, Jay Garner told Bremer: "You're going to drive 50,000 Baathists underground before nightfall. Don't do this."

The American individual appointed to be in charge of five Iraqi ministries is quoted: "If you send them home (all the Baathists), the CPA would have a major problem running most ministries" but Bremer responded that the subject was not open for discussion.

After the de-Baathification orders were implemented, Bremer said teacher appeals would be heard by an Iraqi-led commission--one headed by Ahmed Chalabi, who was described as using de-Baathification as a means of getting even with adversaries. 10 to 15 thousand teachers were fired as a result, which decimated Sunni schools.

Further Paul Bremer on de-Baathification: "It's the single most important thing we've done here and it's the most popular thing."

The neo-con expectation was that the regular Iraqi Army would stay at their bases even though leaflets had been dropped telling them to go home to their families and wait for news.   They went home and the military bases were then looted until threadbare. Later, the soliders protested about the loss of their jobs. Afterwards, someone in the CPA asked: "what happened to the protestors?" The response was: "They're all insurgents now."

For Paul Bremer, taking action, even in the fog of war, was the preference.

Paul Bremer terribly underestimated Ayatollah Sistani's political and religious clout and Sistani clearly out-maneuvered Bremer in the runup to determining how elections and the like would be handled.

A vast majority of the advisory staff in the Green Zone were there because of allegiance to George Bush and the Republican Party. Financial contributors and those having other connections were the chosen. Aadherence to Bush's vision for Iraq was mandatory. Those uncertain about Bush's vision were rejected. Also, key hiring questions were an applicant's stance on Roe v. Wade and which presidnetial candidate did you vote for in the last election? An attempt to headhunt was shut down by those in D>C>despite Bremer's pleas for bodies to fill positions. A galvanizing example: Bremer's budget chief asked to be sent ten go-fers so a search was made, primarily focused on entry level Heritage Foundation job applicants. After ten were hired, six were then assigned to manage Iraq's 13 billion dollar budget although none had any previous financial experience. The CPA was for Bush zealots--similar to a cult.

Three staffers were hired to privatize Iraqi industries. Three! And these industries had no records, no accounts, nothing. Saddam had set up the industries as patronage jobs for Sunnis, for Sunni full employment, regardless of whether or not people actually showed up for work.

A private contractor, Custer Battles LLC, billed the CPA for close to $10 million in 'costs' when its real figure was $3.7 million. Custer Battles, basically a startup company in conjunction with the invasion of Iraq, won the contract because they said they could accomplish what was needed the quickest--that was the sole measuring point for awarding the contract.

Bernie Kerik is quoted as saying: "I can't afford to be here (in Iraq)" because he could get $10,000 a pop for speaking engagements at home. He was a partner in Rudy Guilani's consulting firm and was supposedly there In Iraq) to improve the public image of the good work of the Iraqi police. He repeatedly bullshitted the media that things are getting better on security.

The book offers that what was needed was a chief executive type working on getting funding, not a street cop like Kerik. Kerik held two staff meetings the whole time he was there, which totaled three months. Kerik was described as like an urban cowboy, who preferred going out on raids in the middle of the night rathering than doing any administering. He was vetted by Bush and Bush liked his persona. Again, competence and planning ability were not prerequisites--just likeability.

Kerik self-described his time in Iraq: "I was in my own world. I did my own thing."  

Dan Senor, Bremer's right hand man, is depicted as uber-partisan, not interested in truth or reality. For him, reality was what he said it was.

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